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Res Ipsa Loquitur in Joint Tortfeasor Cases
William B. Nagy*
G ENERALLY, IT HAS BEEN HELD that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is not applicable against multiple defendants where it is not shown
that their liability was joint or that they were in joint or exclusive con-
trol of the injury-producing factor, or where the specific wrongdoer,
among several possible, was not identified.' A fundamental principle of
res ipsa loquitur is that it is available to a plaintiff only when it operates
substantially to identify the probable wrongdoer in a given situation.
2
The difficulty in applying the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in a joint tort-
feasor situation is that:
(1) the incident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by
an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action on
the part of the plaintiff.3
This second stated element of the doctrine is the one which has generally
defeated its application by most jurisdictions in a joint tortfeasor case.4
It has been recognized that, as a general rule, where there are multiple
defendants, any one of whom might have been at fault, it ordinarily is
not proper to say that any one had exclusive control of the instrument
or that any one had or should have had exclusive knowledge as to how
or why the accident occurred.5 Conversely, the doctrine has been held
applicable against multiple defendants where they are properly charged
as joint tortfeasors on the theory that the defendants were engaged in
a joint enterprise or were in joint control of the instrumentality causing
damage to the plaintiff.6 The courts are therefore confronted with a dual
* B.Sc.Pharm., Ohio State University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Huggins v. Morrell & Co., 176 Ohio St. 171, 182, 198 N. E. 2d 448, 455 (1964); Joffre
v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 222 Md. 1, 11; 158 A.2d 631, 637 (1960). As to pleading
of joint torts, see, Oleck, Negligence Forms of Pleading, 457 et passim (1957 rev. ed.).
2 Huggins v. Morrell & Co., supra n. 1; Actiesselskabet Ingrid v. Central R. Co. of
New Jersey, 216 F. 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1914), reh. den. 216 F. 991, cert. den. 238 U. S. 615,
59 L. Ed. 1490, 35 S. Ct. 284.
3 Prosser, Torts, 218 (3rd ed., 1964); Murphy v. City of New York, 19 App. Div. 2d
545, 240 N. Y. S. 2d 883 (1963); Schafer v. Wells, 171 Ohio St. 506, 511, 172 N. E. 2d
708, 711 (1961).
4 Huggins v. Morrell & Co., supra n. 1; Sanders v. Nehi Bottling Co., 30 F. Supp. 332
(1939) ; Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal. App. 2d 674, 129 P. 2d 485 (1942); Shannon v. Jaller,
6 Ohio App. 2d 206, 217 N. E. 2d 234 (1966).
5 Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 61 So. 2d 901, 906 (La. App. 1952) (The
court, however, felt this case was an exception to the rule); Monroe v. H. G. Hill
Stores, 51 So. 2d 645, 648 (La. App. 1951).
6 Koskela v. Albion Lumber Co., 25 Cal. App. 12, 142 P. 851 (1914); Price v. Mc-
Donald, 7 Cal. App. 2d 77, 45 P. 2d 425 (1935); Pierce v. Schroeder, 171 Kan. 259, 232
P. 2d 460 (1951); Biondini v. Amship Corp., 81 Cal. App. 2d 751, 185 P. 2d 94 (1947);
Woods v. Kansas City, K. V. & W. R. R. Co., 134 Kan. 755, 8 P. 2d 404 (1932).
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problem when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is raised in a joint tort-
feasor case. The first problem is whether or not the defendants can
properly be considered as joint tortfeasors, hence more readily allowing
application of the doctrine.7 The second problem is whether the re-
quirement of exclusive control interferes with the doctrine's application
regardless of the legal relationship between the defendants.8 In the
first instance, if the defendants can be properly labeled as joint tort-
feasors, the doctrine is more readily applied since the defendants may
be considered as a single defendant.9 In the second instance, even if the
defendants combined in a joint tort against the plaintiff, the question
as to which defendant was in "control," causing damage to the plaintiff,
may be a serious one which would totally defeat the application of the
doctrine.10
Besides a smattering of cases in a few jurisdictions which have al-
lowed the application of res ipsa where there is present a joint tortfeasor
situation," the only two jurisdictions which have shown any consistency
in doing so are Kansas and California. 12 The courts of the other juris-
dictions have been reluctant to relax the strict requirements of res ipsa
and generally the application of the doctrine against two or more de-
fendants in a joint tortfeasor situation has not been so recognized, and
in most of these cases has been strictly denied. This does not mean
that the doctrine will not apply at all if there is present a joint tort-
feasor situation. Consequently, the doctrine may be invoked against
one of several defendants though it is not and can not be invoked
against others. 13 It must be remembered that in applying the doctrine
it is a question of a substantial probability that the defendant, or de-
7 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 249, 258, 260.
8 Id. at 224, 225; Harrison v. Sutter Street Ry. Co., 134 Cal. 549, 66 P. 787 (1901) (An
early case which considered this problem and denied application of res ipsa).
9 Koskela v. Albion Lumber Co., supra n. 6; Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cal-
ifornia, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 183, 199 (1949).
10 Actiesselskabet Ingrid v. Central R. Co. of N. J., supra n. 2; Wolf v. American
Tract Soc., 164 N. Y. 30, 58 N. E. 31 (1900); Murphy v. City of New York, supra n. 3;
Corcoran v. Banner Super Market, Inc., 20 A. D. 2d 552, 245 N. Y. S. 2d 175 (1963).
11 Smith v. Claude Neon Lights, Inc., 110 N. J. L. 326, 164 A. 423 (1933); Bonner v.
Boudreaux, 8 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 1942); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P. 2d
317 (1953); Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A. 2d 451 (1953).
12 Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P. 2d 740 (1935); Ybarra v. Spangard,
25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687 (1944) (Held not applicable in situation where "a con-
scious person receives an injury from a known object in a known way," Gobin v.
Avenue Food Mart, 2 Cal. Rptr. 822, 824 [Cal. App. 1960]); Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal.
2d 654, 226 P. 2d 574 (1951); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948);
Nichols v. Nold, supra n. 11; Waterbury v. Riss, 169 Kan. 271, 219 P. 2d 673 (1950);
Blue Stem Feed Yards, Inc. v. Craft, 191 Kan. 605, 383 P. 2d 540 (1963); Whitby v.
One-O-One Trailer Rental Co., 191 Kan. 653, 383 P. 2d 560 (1963).
13 Armstrong v. Wallace, supra n. 12; Godfrey v. Brown, 220 Cal. 57, 29 P. 2d 165
(1934); Shannon v. Jaller, supra n. 4; Robinson v. Nightingale, 188 Kan. 377, 362
P. 2d 432 (1961).
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fendants, have been negligent, and in those jurisdictions other than
Kansas and California where the doctrine has been applied against a
defendant when several defendants are before the court, this question
of probability has been based on the theory of control.14 In the juris-
dictions of Kansas and California which have not relied on the element
of control, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been applied against one
of several defendants, regardless of their relationship, because it was
more probable than not that a specific defendant was the negligent
party.15 This question of probability is resolved by the evidence pre-
sented before the court (essentially circumstantial in nature, other-
wise the plaintiff would not require, or be allowed the use of the
doctrine if he has direct evidence). In California, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is applied and creates an inference of negligence on the
part of the defendant where, in the light of past experience, (1) the
accident was probably the result of someone's negligence and (2) the
defendant was probably the responsible person. 16
It is easily seen that the application of res ipsa against a single de-
fendant, if the generally recognized elements are present, poses no great
problem to the court. The really substantial question is whether, if the
plaintiff relies upon res ipsa in his case, the court will allow the use
of the doctrine against one or more defendants in a joint tortfeasor case,
or against them regardless of their legal relationship.17
The leading case which applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
against two or more defendants in a joint tortfeasor situation is Ybarra
v. Spangard,'8 in which the plaintiff brought an action to recover for
an injury which he allegedly received while unconscious and a patient
in the hands of several doctors and nurses. If the exact requirements
for res ipsa to apply had been followed by the court, the use of the doc-
trine against all the defendants would be highly questionable. 19 The
case is a perfect example of the relaxation of the control element of
res ipsa, thereby allowing its application in a joint tortfeasor situation. 2°
14 Shannon v. Jaller, supra n. 4; Jensen v. Linner, 260 Minn. 22, 108 N. W. 2d 705
(1961).
15 Fowler v. Seaton, 39 Cal. Rptr. 881, 394 P. 2d 697 (1964); Armstrong v. Wallace,
supra n. 12; Robinson v. Nightingale, supra n. 4; However, see dissenting opinion of
Justice Traynor in Raber v- Tumin, supra n. 12, at 579; Also see Berryman v. Bay-
shore Construction Co., 207 Cal. App. 2d 331, 24 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1962).
16 Inouye v. Black, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (Cal. App. 1965); Quintal v. Laurel Grove
Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 397 P. 2d 161 (1964); Faulk v. $oberanes, 56
Cal. 2d 466, 363 P. 2d 593 (1961).
17 Supra n. 7.
18 Supra n. 12.
19 Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P. 2d 955 (1961); Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur
Against Multiple Defendants, 52 Columbia L. Rev. 537, 538-539 (1952).
20 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 227-228.
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This problem of who, among several defendants, was probably the re-
sponsible person, as well as the problem of who, among the several de-
fendants, had control of the injury-causing instrumentality, did not deter
the court from applying res ipsa against all the defendants. This case
represents the extreme view of the doctrine's application (applying res
ipsa against all the defendants) in a joint tortfeasor situation.2 1 The
court felt the case was representative of a joint tortfeasor situation, that
all the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty of a high degree of care,
and that the defendants could be considered as involved in a joint en-
terprise.22 The application of the doctrine was aided by the fact that
the plaintiff was unconscious during the period in which his injury was
probably inflicted. The defendants were in a better position than the
plaintiff to explain the occurrence leading to the injury.23 This aspect
of superior knowledge on the part of the defendants has been used in
California and Kansas to aid the courts in applying the doctrine against
several defendants, 24 whereas the aspect of control has been either mini-
mized, avoided or disregarded. 25
Dean Prosser believes that the element of control by the defendant
which the plaintiff must show to apply the doctrine is misleading, since
there are a great many situations in which the defendant's responsibility
is apparent even though the instrumentality causing injury to the
plaintiff is in the control of another.26 Another problem with the con-
trol element of res ipsa is that a tort situation rarely arises in which
it can be said there is actual joint control of the instrument causing in-
jury by two or more defendants. The control is usually successive, 27 or
at the most concurrent28 in nature, thereby making it even more diffi-
cult to say that any one of several defendants had exclusive control,
21 Res Ipsa Loquitur Against Multiple Defendants, op. cit. supra n. 19.
22 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 9 at 223; But see Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in
Naufragio, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 648 (1950).
23 Ybarra v. Spangard, supra n. 12.
24 Ibid.; Nichols v. Nold, supra n. 11.
25 As stated in Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P. 2d 344, at 348,
"The requirement of control is not an absolute one." The test should be one of right
of control and not actual control. Also see Metz v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 Cal. App.
2d 260, 124 P. 2d 670 (1942).
26 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 9 at 199-200; Knell v. Morris, 39 Cal. 2d 450, 247 P. 2d
352 (1952) (Landlord-Contractor case); Weddle v. Loges, 52 Cal. App. 2d 77, 125 P.
2d 914 (1942) (Principal-Agent); Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 711, 98
S. W. 2d 969 (1936) (Landlord's Non-delegable Duty).
27 Ybarra v. Spangard, supra n. 12; Loch v. Confair, supra n. 11; Nichols v. Nold,
supra n. 11.
28 Armstrong v. Wallace, supra n. 12; Smith v. Claude Neon Lights, Inc., supra n. 11;
Weddle v. Phelan, 177 So. 407 (La. App. 1937), moving car in which plaintiff, a
passenger, was hit from behind by a truck. But is this a true res ipsa situation?
See 48 Harv. L. Rev. 328 (1934).
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or that the defendants were in joint control, in order to apply the doc-
trine against any or all of them.29
In Kansas, in the case of Robinson v. Nightingale, res ipsa was ap-
plied against one of three defendants, though it was argued that there
was joint control of the instrument, in this case an overhead hoist which
fell on the plaintiff truck driver, and that res ipsa be applied against
all.30 The court stated, "in reaching the foregoing conclusion we note
that in applying the doctrine in Nichols v. Nold,'3 1 there was no finding
that the multiple defendants were joint tortfeasors, or that they were
in joint control of the instrumentality." 32 The court seemed to be
struggling with the problem of exacting a satisfactory definition for joint
tortfeasors and the element of control which is ordinarily required to
apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.33 It would seem that in Kansas,
the requirement of control of res ipsa loquitur, which would ordinarily
defeat application of the doctrine in a joint tortfeasor situation, is held
subordinate to the possibly more demanding theory of strict liability, or
liability without fault, of manufacturers, contractors, etc. 34 The federal
courts are satisfied by finding "dominant" control, in joint tort cases,
rather than "exclusive" control.3 5
Those courts which have disregarded the control element believe
that in applying the doctrine the fact that evidence as to the true ex-
planation of the injury-causing event is more readily accessible to the
defendant than to the plaintiff should be recognized.36 There is much
to be said for this condition, especially in the medical malpractice cases
where the plaintiff is unconscious3 7 or under anesthesia during an op-
eration.38 Also, when there are two or more defendants who may have
been negligent, the plaintiff may have difficulty in showing which de-
29 McCoid, Negligence Actions Against Multiple Defendants, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 480,
491 (1955); Richter, Note, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Suits Against
Multiple Defendants, 1954 Wash. U. L. Q. 215, 227; Seavey, supra n. 23 at 646.
30 Supra n. 13.
31 Supra n. 11 (A leading Kansas case in which res ipsa was applied against bottler,
manufacturer, and retailer joined by a plaintiff injured by an exploding bottle).
32 Supra n. 13, 362 P. 2d at 437.
33 Id. at 436.
34 Annot., Contractor-Liability to Third Person, 58 A. L. R. 2d 865, 870 (1958).
35 Taylor v. Reading Co., 83 F. Supp. 804 (D. C. Penna. 1949).
36 This phase of the doctrine is supported by several distinguished legal writers.
Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 3; Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 Buff. L. Rev. 1(1951); Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 10 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 166 (1937).
37 Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P. 2d 34 (1951).
38 Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., supra n. 5; Ybarra v. Spangard, supra
n. 12; Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal. 2d 290, 188 P. 2d 12 (1947); Cavero v.
Franklin General Benev. Soc., 36 Cal. 2d 301, 223 P. 2d 471 (1950); Seneris v. Haas,
45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P. 2d 915 (1955); Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47
Cal. 2d 509, 305 P. 2d 36 (1957).
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fendant was negligent without the defendants giving testimony.39 Dean
Prosser has stated that such an element would make "sheer igno-
rance . . . the most powerful weapon in the law." 40
Laying aside the problems heretofore discussed for a moment, let
us take a look at another phase of res ipsa which must be discussed in
order to appreciate and understand fully the problem of its application
in a joint tortfeasor situation. This phase involves the doctrine's pro-
cedural effect once it is applied.
41
It is generally recognized that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of law
but a type of circumstantial evidence which may permit an inference of
negligence to be drawn by the jury.42 A few courts have given the doc-
trine the effect of a presumption, i.e., a directed verdict for the plaintiff
will be given unless the defendant comes forward with sufficient evi-
dence to meet it. 4 3 In a 1954 California case, the court stated that the
doctrine of res ipsa raises not a presumption, but an inference of a
"special kind" which the defendant must rebut.44 Recently, this "in-
ferential presumption" was extended further in California by a de-
cision which allowed its use in a non-jury case.4 5 It is conceded, though,
that most jurisdictions merely treat the doctrine as a type of circum-
stantial evidence which permits an inference of negligence to be drawn
by the jury.46 In the case of Waterbury v. Riss, the court stated:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not one of substantive law, but
is one pertaining to evidence. Where it is relied upon alone it simply
means that certain facts and circumstances raise an inference or
presumption of liability.47
Similarly, as recognized in Ohio, res ipsa loquitur means that the facts
of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they
compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of
39 Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948), plaintiff was simultaneously
shot at by two hunting companions.
40 Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 10 So. Cal. L. Rev.
459, 464 (1937). But see Ireland v. Marsden, 108 Cal. App. C32, 644, 291 P. 912, 917
(1930), where the court stated, "'I do not know,' does not explain anything." Also,
see, Ybarra v. Spangard, supra n. 12, where the court was not satisfied with the
defendants' explanations.
41 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 232-239.
42 Renneckar v. Canton Terminal Restaurant, Inc., 148 Ohio St. 119, 73 N. E. 2d 498
(1947); Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 233; Marzotto v. Gay Garment Co., 11 N. J.
Super. 368, 78 A. 2d 394, aff'd., 7 N. J. 116, 80 A. 2d 554 (1951); George Foltis, Inc. v.
City of New York, 287 N. Y. 108, 38 N. E. 2d 455 (1941).
43 Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P. 2d 88 (1958); Florence Coca Cola Bottling Co.
v. Sullivan, 259 Ala. 56, 65 So. 2d 169 (1953); Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 234; See
also Simpson v. Gray Line Co., 226 Ore. 71, 358 P. 2d 516 (1960), which overruled
four prior cases which had given the doctrine the effect of a presumption.
44 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041 (1954).
45 Seely v. Combs, 52 Cal. Rptr. 578, 416 P. 2d 810 (Cal. App. 1966).
46 Prosser, supra n. 42.
47 Supra n. 12, 219 P. 2d at 685-686.
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negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evi-
dence to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as conclusive. 48
When it is seen that the application of the doctrine is a procedural
one involving the laws of evidence and of proof, then perhaps there
should be no real controversy as to its application at all. Ultimately, the
problem is really one involving fact situations which differ widely and
the evidence and facts presented must be resolved by the trier of fact.
In the cases studied, there seem to be few instances in which the eventual
outcome was unjustified. It must be understood that although the ap-
plication of the doctrine was the main issue in these cases, in many
instances their eventual outcome was or may have been decided on other
factors or issues. 49 Also, the problems of proof and the legal procedures
in negligence cases vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Thus, ir-
respective of the moot question of the doctrine's application, the case
should be eventually justly resolved, under the facts, by the triers of
fact.
It is obvious that res ipsa is a plaintiff's doctrine and that the courts
through the years have relaxed its requirements in order to avoid the
injustice of non-suiting plaintiffs where it was clear that these plain-
tiffs should recover for their injuries.
In these cases of a res ipsa nature, more often than not it is quite
difficult for a plaintiff to come forward with any direct evidence. Thus,
if there are several defendants, to sue, even if they are joint tortfeasors,
the plaintiff is often stymied because he cannot prove which one is neg-
ligent. According to Dean Prosser,
It is never enough for the plaintiff to prove merely that he has
been injured by the negligence of someone unidentified. Even
though there is beyond all possible doubt negligence in the air, it is
still necessary to bring it home to the defendant. On this too the
plaintiff has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence; and in any case where it is clear that it is at least equally
probable that the negligence was that of another, the court must
direct the jury that the plaintiff has not proved his case. 50
Thus the courts have resorted to other explanations to allow plain-
tiffs' recoveries where it was possible the plaintiffs might be non-suited
and a gross injustice be effected. We see this situation in the California
medical malpractice cases as explained in a recent California case by
Justice Friedman:
48 Renneckar v. Canton Terminal Restaurant, Inc., supra n. 42, 73 N. E. 2d at 500;
Shafer v. Wells, supra n. 3, 172 N. E. 2d at 711-712.
49 Loch v. Confair, supra n. 11; Nichols v. Nold, supra n. 11; Annot., Contractor-
Liability to Third Person, supra n. 35. See also the effect of the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher as expressed in the Actiesselskabet case, supra n. 2, but compare Judson v.
Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 P. 1020 (1895).
50 Prosser, supra n. 3 at 222.
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A group of persons and instrumentalities may combine in the per-
formance of a medical procedure culminating in an unexpected,
mysterious and disastrous result. With the sources of disaster per-
sonified in a group of defendants, the demand for evidence pointing
the finger of probability at any one of them is relaxed; all may be
called upon to give the jury evidence of care. 5 1
Although it is seen that California has relaxed the requirements of
res ipsa in joint tortfeasor cases, an exception is present in the ex-
ploding bottle cases where the plaintiff joins the manufacturer, bottler,
shipper, and even the retailer as defendants.52  The courts in these
cases have held that in order to apply res ipsa the plaintiff must show
that the bottle causing the injury was not mishandled or tampered with
by others.53 The only rationale behind the application of the doctrine
against several defendants in these cases is based on the theory of strict
liability.54
There seems to be no reason why the doctrine should not apply if
there is vicarious liability between the defendants, or if there is present
a true joint tortfeasor situation, that is, if the defendants acted jointly or
in concert or if they were in joint control of the instrumentality causing
injury. The defendants should then have the burden of showing that
they acted with due care.55 The effect, then, of applying the doctrine
would be that of a presumption and not an inference, thereby requiring
the defendants to come forward with evidence sufficient to show they
were not negligent. The issue would thus be joined, and the jury could
weigh the evidence. 56 This rule has been suggested because it would
accomplish two things: first, it would allow recovery from injuries for
plaintiffs as against those defendants who fail to produce exculpating
evidence,57 and second, those defendants who are clearly not negligent
are given the chance to avoid any liability.58 Disallowing the fact of
51 Inouye v. Black, supra n. 16 at 316.
52 Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P. 2d 522 (1949); Zentz v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., supra n. 26; McClelland v. Acme Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 698,
207 P. 2d 591 (1949).
53 Huggins v. Morrell & Co., supra n. 1 (Ohio follows a similar rule in not holding
res ipsa applicable in exploding-bottle cases involving multiple defendants). Most
interesting is the case of Koktavy v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc., 160 Ohio St.
461, 52 Ohio Op. 351 (1954), where Justice Zimmerman, in a dissenting opinion, felt
the plaintiff had overcome this seemingly impossible burden. See also Hadley v.
Hillcrest Dairy, Inc., 341 Mass. 624, 171 N. E. 2d 293 (1961), and Pound, The Problem
of the Exploding Bottle, 40 B. U. L. Rev. 167 (1960).
54 Nichols v. Nold and Loch v. Confair, supra n. 11; Dissenting and concurring, in
part, opinion of Justice Traynor in Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., supra n. 52, 203 P.
2d at 532. ". . . a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he
has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to human beings."
55 Richter, op. cit. supra n. 30.
56 Id. at 231.
57 Id. at 232.
58 Id.
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vicarious liability or of actual joint liability, this rule would allow the
courts to apply res ipsa against two or more defendants in those joint
tortfeasor cases where it would be unjust to deny plaintiff recovery, or
where it is evident that the plaintiff is at a disadvantage in producing
adequate evidence to prove his case.5 9 Of course, it is material that the
plaintiff must fully show that res ipsa applies, in order to avoid at-
tempts on the part of plaintiffs to shift the burden of proof in negli-
gence cases merely by invoking the doctrine.o
It is quite clear that the problem of applicability of the doctrine in
joint tortfeasor cases is based upon the fact that the doctrine was evolved
when the courts were confronted with tort cases involving one plaintiff
and one defendant. It is to the credit of our courts that in most cases
they have not allowed the doctrine to be totally defeated when two or
more defendants are before it, basing this distinction on the aspect
of probability of negligence in some cases and on the element of con-
trol in others. It may not be to their credit that a few of them have
allowed the doctrine to be applied against all defendants irrespective
of their defendants' legal relations, although this alleged injustice is
open to question. Have the courts in these cases really placed that much
of an unjust burden upon the defendants? Depending on the procedural
effect and the legal weight given to the doctrine, the problems of proof
and the rules of evidence in negligence cases in these jurisdictions, per-
haps the courts were justified in their decisions.
As suggested by one writer, it would appear that a just rule in
applying the doctrine would be to give it the effect of requiring some
explanation from the defendants. 6 1 The problem of whether or not this
explanation is confronted by a presumption or an inference of negligence
is a highly controversial oneG2 and could be resolved only by the policy
or procedure of each independent jurisdiction.
No definite solutions or answers to the problems are presented since
the legal complexities involved have already been thoroughly reviewed
by other writers, including legal academicians of great learning and
reputation.6 3 It is hoped that the reader has been enlightened as to the
problems which will be confronted, and their possible solutions, when
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is raised in a joint tortfeasor case.
59 Id.
60 Voss v. Bridwell, supra n. 20.
61 McCoid, op. cit. supra n. 30 at 505.
62 Carpenter, op. cit. supra n. 36; Jaffe, op. cit. supra n. 36; Prosser, op. cit. supra
n. 9; Seavey, op. cit. supra n. 23.
63 Seavey, Law of Torts, 171 (2d ed., 1964). For an extensive list see McCoid, op. cit.
supra n. 30, footnote 1 at 480.
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